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Summary
In this paper, we consider whether there is a clear moral justification for the proposal that societal value preferences
(SVPs) should be included in Cost Effectiveness Analyses (CEA) of health care resource allocations. We argue, first,
that proponents of the use of SVPs need to be clear about the relationship between these values and moral principles.
In particular, once moral principles are accepted as ruling out some SVPs (such as those that are irrational or
revealing prejudice), an account is required of why we need to appeal to SVPs rather than moral principles to
determine a just division of health care resources. Secondly, we consider whether an independent moral justification
might underwrite the use of SVPs. In various places in the literature the notions of representation, presumed consent
and democratic decision making appear to be invoked as candidates for fulfilling this justificatory role. We discuss
some problems with each of these justifications in the hope of eliciting a more comprehensive proposal from the
proponents of SVPs. We conclude that, although a number of interesting proposals have been made, no compelling
justification for including SVPs in CEA has yet been systematically articulated. Copyright # 2002 John Wiley &
Sons, Ltd.
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Introduction
An important question in health economics and
ethics is how to justly allocate health care
resources under conditions of scarcity. One possi-
ble answer, offered by health economists, is
to employ a version of the formal allocation
method of Cost Effectiveness Analysis (CEA)
using Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALYs). This
form of CEA is generally referred to as Cost
Utility Analysis (CUA). QALYs give a quality-
weighted value between 0 and 1 to each year of life
under particular health conditions. The most cost-
effective distribution of resources is the one that
results in the most QALYs gained for the least
dollars spent.
Implicit in this method of allocation is a form of
utilitarianism, as it is assumed that the best
allocation scheme is the one that maximizes the
number of healthy life years in the population
as a whole. In recent literature, this implicit
utilitarian value standard has been challenged
because people’s actual preferences for allocation
schemes seem to diverge from utility maximiza-
tion. Instead of simply aggregating individual
utility assessments, it is argued, societal value
preferences (SVPs) should be taken into account.
In this paper, we consider whether there is a
clear moral justification for the claim that SVPs
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should play a role in health care allocation. We
begin by pointing out that proponents of the use of
SVPs recognize that not just any such preferences
should be taken into account. More specifically,
they exclude morally objectionable preferences.
Given the implicit priority granted to ethical
principles, we argue that proponents of the use
of SVPs have the burden of showing that SVPs are
not superfluous to such principles. We then
consider whether the use of SVPs may nevertheless
be independently morally justified. Although a
number of interesting options seem initially avail-
able, we argue that no compelling justification has
yet been systematically articulated.
The problemwith CUA
To determine individual health-related utilities for
the purpose of CUA, people are asked about the
value they would place on a year of life under
specified health conditions. Two of the standard
methods for determining these values are time
trade off (TTO) and standard gamble (SG). In
TTO, respondents are asked how many years of
their life in a specific health condition they would
forfeit to live the other years of their life in perfect
health. In SG, respondents are asked what risk of
death they would accept to be cured of a specific
health condition. For example, if a respondent
would accept either a 20% risk of death or forfeit 2
of 10 years of life to be cured of blindness, then
under a QALY analysis, one year of life with
blindness is worth 0.8 (or 80% of a year of perfect
capacity).
Serious ethical problems arise, however, when
these individual health utility assessments are used
in social policy decisions about health care
through CUA. While it might be worth a 20%
risk of death to one to be cured of blindness, one
does not thereby agree that it is better to give
priority to a program that will save the lives
of ten sighted persons rather than ten blind
persons. Yet the straightforward CUA seems
to imply that this would be the case. For this
reason, ‘recommendations emerging from [CUA]
can stand starkly at odds with the values of justice
and non-discrimination’ [1].
The moral problems that are generated by using
intra-personal utility assessments in inter-personal
allocation decisions drive some theorists to try to
develop methods of directly assessing individual’s
preferences for inter-personal health care alloca-
tion. One method designed to elicit these prefer-
ences is the person trade off (PTO) question. In a
PTO question respondents might be asked how
many people in a specific health condition would
need to be cured before the funding of this
treatment is more socially valuable than saving
the lives of ten other people. In general, the
empirical evidence seems to show that values other
than utility maximization come into play when
people are specifically asked about inter-personal
allocation preferences. For example, people gen-
erally prefer to help the least well off first, and to
distribute goods equitably, other things being
equal. Proponents of SVPs argue that these kinds
of preferences should be taken into account in
CEA in order to escape the moral problems posed
by the straightforward use of CUA.
Moral principles and societal value
preferences
One argument advanced by those who advocate
taking SVPs seriously is that the values are often
supported by independent moral arguments, and
thus have a greater status than mere ‘preferences.’
For example, principles of fairness, which require
that we give priority to helping ‘the worst off,’
support the preferences elicited in PTO studies
attaching significance to the severity of illness.
Those calling for the inclusion of SVPs in CEA
maintain that it is ‘ethically objectionable’ not to
consider such values where there exist independent
arguments underwriting them:
Some aspects of treatment are such that omitting
them from allocative decisionmaking is ethically
objectionable. This is a more demanding notion than
the simple claim that such aspects involve overlooked
‘preferences’ or unexamined ‘values.’ For the omis-
sion of a factor to be ethically objectionable, one has
to be able to articulate some argument for the
preferences it generates, not merely point out that
people hold those preferences [1].
The claim here is not that it is necessary and
sufficient for justifying the inclusion of a societal
value into CEA that a moral argument can be
generated which supports the value. For we can
generate moral arguments on behalf of SVPs that
proponents of the use of SVPs would seek to
exclude from allocation decisions. Imagine that the
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PTO questions revealed that most individuals are
prepared to sacrifice the lives of persons with
disabilities to save the lives of persons without
disabilities. While it might be possible to produce a
version of a utilitarian argument in support of
these values, those advocating the use of SVPs
would not want such values to figure into health
policy decisions. On their view, preferences count
only ‘assuming that those preferences are not
irrational or ethically objectionable, as when they
reflect discriminatory attitudes.’ [1]
But while it seems reasonable to condition the
use of SVPs on their being ethically acceptable,
this proviso gives rise to the question of why it is
necessary to consider SVPs at all. If we cannot
justify an appeal to SVPs without first establishing
that they are not ethically objectionable, then
SVPs will be superfluous to the extent that we can
resolve resource allocation issues through the
application of ethical principles.
One might respond that we are not able to
provide decisive moral arguments for many of the
allocation questions we are concerned with. This is
not necessarily to say that decisive arguments do
not exist. One could instead hold that unless we
discover such arguments, it is legitimate to accord
SVPs the status otherwise reserved for moral
values. Peter Ubel expresses sentiments along
these lines:
Many allocation dilemmas have no simple solutions,
and highly trained, intellectually rigorous philoso-
phers would completely disagree with each other
about the best solution, for example, about the extent
to which severely ill patients deserve treatment
priority. In such situations, the public deserves a
role [2].
Although Ubel seems skeptical about the
possibility of consensus on many allocation issues,
it appears implicit in his remarks that we ought to
follow the lead of philosophers and other intellec-
tuals to the extent they are able to achieve
consensus. But then the claim seems to be that
we should give priority to ethical principles over
preferences, at least where such consensus exists.
While proponents of the use of SVPs in CEA
would no doubt decry the creation of philosopher
kings, their own arguments may ultimately pro-
vide the crowning.
Of course, there are often deep disagreements
amongst moral and political philosophers about
the values that should inform health policy. But
consensus on policy need not elude us in the face
of such disagreement. It is sometimes possible to
construct policy around points of convergence
between theories that oppose one another in their
more comprehensive forms [3]. Those advocating
the use of SVPs need to better establish the precise
limits of moral and political theory for settling
allocation issues. In the absence of such an
account, it is not clear whether employing SVPs
is warranted. On the other hand, even if we
suppose that ethical analysis cannot resolve most
allocation problems, it is not clear that there is an
adequate justification for appealing to SVPs. We
turn to this question in the next section.
Independentmoral justi¢cation for
societal value preferences
One approach to justifying the use of SVPs would
be to show that their use is independently morally
justified, rather than being relevant only when
moral arguments run out. If there were such a
justification, then there would seem to be good
prima facie reason to believe that SVPs should
play a role in health care allocation.
To give an example of how an independent
moral justification would function, we return to
individual utility preferences. There is a strong
moral argument to be made for letting competent
adults make decisions about their own well being.
This claim is stronger than the idea that indivi-
duals are usually the best judges in these matters.
That would be a merely practical, and therefore
contingent, claim. There are moral reasons to
respect persons’ choices about their own utility
even when the choices that they make are not the
ones that we think are best for them. Of course we
do not always let people make these decisions for
themselves. When the cost to their well being is
great we may turn paternalistic in the hope that
they will realize later that they were in error about
their own best interests. The important point is
that we would need to show in any particular case
that we are justified in ignoring the prima facie
moral value of respecting a person’s own decision
about his or her well being.
What is needed in the case of SVPs, then, is an
argument for their independent moral justification.
Like the case of respect for individual’s decisions
about their own utility, this justification would
register on the ethical scales even when the
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decision generated by the use of SVPs does not
maximize QALYs for the society in question (as
would the straightforward use of CUA). At this
juncture, one might be tempted to claim that the
justification for the use of SVPs in the inter-
personal case is a rather obvious extension of the
justification for the use of an individual’s own
CUA in the intra-personal case. Just as personal
values are relevant to decisions about the distribu-
tion of goods at the intra-personal level, social
values are relevant to decisions about the distribu-
tion of goods at the inter-personal level. After all,
it seems trivially true that social values are relevant
to decisions that are grounded in questions of such
value. As it seems that social values are at least
partly at issue in questions about the distribution
of scarce health care resources, one might natu-
rally conclude that SVPs are to that same extent
relevant in answering these questions.
This conclusion leaves open the extent to
which social values should factor into decisions
about the distribution of health care resources.
Another critic might be tempted to argue that
these values per se bear no direct relation to the
real issue at stake: namely, the just distribution of
scarce health care resources. But we do not want to
argue along these lines. We do not reject out of
hand that social values are relevant to questions
about the distribution of shared but scarce social
goods. While we would dispute the claim that
these values are the only such relevant factor
(indeed, we think that the fact that the proponents
of SVPs acknowledge their potential moral limita-
tions [1] shows that they would also disagree with
such a conclusion), we allow that they may play an
important role. However, the move from aggre-
gating statistically representative individual pre-
ferences about social values to the claim of
generating useful social values needs justification.
In other words, what is needed is a non-circular
way of showing that social values are indeed
represented by SVPs.
A clue as to what this justification might be
can be found by looking at a remark by Paul
Menzel:
One of the strongest responses that a society can
make to particular parties who are disadvantaged by
a social policy is to note that those parties themselves
(or persons relevantly similar to them) have had a
major role in the decision-making process that led to
the policy in question. . . CEA’s moral and political
future will be brighter if it can note precisely where in
its process influential values have been contributed
by representatives of those who are affected by final
decisions [4, our italics].
Following Menzel, one might argue strategically
that political support would be stronger for
allocation schemes that are perceived as taking
into account the preferences of those affected by
the outcomes. In so far as this claim is about
increased political acceptability, it is an empirical
claim. It might turn out that the political future of
CEA will be ‘brighter’ if people feel that moral
theorists, economists, and health care delivery
experts spent considerable time and effort deter-
mining which moral principles should modify
cost-utility considerations. In any case, the
political point would not, without further sub-
stantive argument, provide a moral justification
for taking SVPs into account in allocating social
goods.
However, Menzel means to make a moral claim
as well as a political point. In the context of this
quote the argument for the moral claim is not
entirely apparent, but we might glean some insight
from another part of the passage cited above:
If in the process of discerning the critical values
involved, CEA has queried people who can reason-
ably be construed to represent the patients in a
category that ends up disadvantaged by resulting
allocation, a ready response to critics is available [4].
The moral claim, then, seems to be that patients
who are disadvantaged by the allocation have
nevertheless had their views represented. Since
their views have been adequately represented, they
have no strong basis for disagreement with the
resulting outcome. But it seems that no one is
reasonably construed to represent the choices that
we would have made if their choices differ from
ours. In fact, whether or not we were part of the
sampled group, if the aggregated preferences that
result are not the ones that we would have chosen,
they are not reasonably construed as representa-
tive of our values.
One might object here, that in the case of
collective decision making an aggregated outcome
may differ from what we would have chosen, and
yet still ‘represent’ our choice because of the
procedure by which the collective decision was
determined. Democratic procedures may offer one
example of this type of collective ‘representation’.
In the next section, we will consider whether there
is a democratic procedural justification available
to proponents of SVPs. Before we consider this
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alternative, however, we will need to see what is
wrong with the claim that others may represent
our choices when they are asked their opinions in
our stead.
The problem with Menzel’s claim seems to stem
from an essential yet subtle ambiguity in the terms
‘represent’ and ‘representative.’ There is an im-
portant difference between being represented by
one’s lawyer and being representative of a certain
group (say generation X-ers). We think of people
as representative of a certain class or group if they
share particular characteristics. This is the sense of
‘represent’ that Menzel is justified in using in the
passage above. The problem is that this sense of
‘represent’ is not the morally weighty sense that he
needs to make the argument work. In order for
someone to represent someone else in a morally
(or legally) significant manner, they must either be
that person, or be appointed in some way to
represent their interests (as in some cases of
artificial persons). When and how a person (or
institution) can be truly thought to represent
another is not our concern here, although it is a
difficult and important question. Our point is
simply that ‘representing’ in a statistical sense (in
this case by sharing certain identifiable character-
istics), is not ‘representing’ in any sense that would
justify the conclusion offered above.
Menzel acknowledges that the defense he offers
may not be as strong as the consent of those
disadvantaged. Since Menzel claims that the
strongest form of moral defense would be the
consent of the disadvantaged, we should see
whether this argument might go through. To
consider this claim, we need to turn to a passage
from his book, Strong Medicine:
Seldom will the actual individuals who get disadvan-
taged by a quality adjustment have been previously
consulted. . . To most people, though, the fact of the
sampling itself is probably not very bothersome. . .
With a good enough initial sample, therefore, it is
acceptable to presume people’s consent to the trade-
offs others choose [5].
So it seems that while Menzel does not want to
claim that those disadvantaged by the quality
adjustment have given actual consent (unless, of
course, they have), there are nevertheless condi-
tions under which we can presume their consent.
This claim is initially surprising, since there are
well-known theoretical problems with the notion
of presumed consent. It seems prima facie true that
the only way to get consent from person A, is for
A to give his or her consent or for a person who
represents (in the morally robust sense) the
interests of A, to give consent for A. If an
allocation scheme disadvantages A and he or she
does not agree to this disadvantage (through his or
her own consent or the consent of a proper
representative), then it seems that he or she has
not given consent, presumed or otherwise.
Menzel attempts to justify the claim that
presumed consent, while not as morally weighty
as actual consent, nevertheless may serve as
sufficient moral justification for a health care
allocation plan under some conditions [5]. Of
particular relevance for our discussion is the
following condition on the use of presumed
consent: actual consent would be impossible or
prohibitively expensive (where ‘prohibitively ex-
pensive’ is defined by what the person him or
herself would (presumably?) view as too costly) [5].
Menzel also points out that any justification
relying on presumed consent bears the burden of
showing that what is presumed is what people
would have actually agreed to (although the
difficulty of getting reasonably good evidence
about what people would have consented to is
not to stand in the way of the general appropri-
ateness of presuming consent) [5].
But do these qualifications have any real bearing
on the question of whether presumed consent itself
can bear the weight of moral justification? Menzel
thinks that the answer to this question is clearly
‘yes’. He writes,
If others are careful and do not bypass one’s actual
consent where it is feasible to consult one. . .attempts
to ascertain one’s hypothetical will do not disrespect
one’s autonomy. We should put the matter even
more strongly: if others ignore the possibility of
presuming one’s prior consent, they assault an
important dimension of one’s freedom amid the
imperfect realities of historical social life [5].
So it seems that, for Menzel, in some cases
discerning presumed consent is not only morally
justified, it is morally required.
However, the idea that we could ever adequately
ascertain a person’s ‘hypothetical will’ in a way
that would warrant the application of SVPs to
allocation decisions seems problematic. Responses
to SVP questions are, after all, not uniform by any
stretch of the imagination. To take just one
example, in a study cited by Menzel et al. of 150
Norwegian politicians ‘accountable for health
policy at the county level’ there was no consensus
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on how resources should be divided [1]. When
asked to choose an allocation of resources between
treatments that would offer a little help for a group
with severe illness or treatments that would offer
considerable help for a group with moderate
illness, 45 per cent chose equal division of
resources, 37 per cent gave priority to those with
the more severe illness, and 11 per cent gave
priority to those with moderate illness [1]. While
this is most assuredly evidence that this group
generally favours helping the least well off
first (even when this will not maximize utility)
it could not possibly count as evidence for the
presumed consent of any particular politician
to such an allocation scheme. Similarly, for
any given SVP, one can easily assume that the
individual value preferences that go into the
overall calculation of the ‘societal value’ may
diverge from one another by wide margins.
If this is the case, it is hard to see how the
project of accurately presuming consent for
the application of SVPs can even get off the
ground.
While rationing is necessary, presumed consent
based on an appeal to SVPs does not seem to offer
adequate moral justification for such rationing. To
solidify the argument on this point, we should
consider the likely bases for the claim of presumed
consent to a health care allocation plan. The two
most plausible candidates are rationality (or
reasonableness) and values. In other words, we
might argue that we could presume consent to
an allocation scheme because that scheme is
the most rational and hence that all reason-
able people would accept it. On the other
hand, we might presume consent on the grounds
that the allocation accurately reflects the
values expressed by those persons affected by the
allocation.
Menzel’s claim is of the second sort. He argues
against idealized versions of presumed consent
(such as that represented by an appeal to the ‘most
rational’ allocation) writing, ‘However few or
many irrationalities of real people are acceptable
in actual consent, exactly those could also be
acceptable in presumed consent- no more, no
fewer’ [5]. Moreover, rationing plans that appeal
to what reasonable persons would accept would
have no need for bothering with determining
SVPs. We shall assume, then, that the underlying
foundation for Menzel’s appeal to presumed
consent is the (non-idealized) SVPs of those
affected by the allocation.
The crucial difference between using idealized
and non-idealized versions of presumed consent is
that any actual person disagreeing with the
allocation plan cannot be presumed to consent to
it in the non-idealized case. In the idealized case,
however, such consent might still be presumed
since it depends for its validity, not on the real
wishes of actual persons, but on the idealized
wishes of model persons. Hence it seems that an
appeal to non-idealized presumed consent could
not justify the application of SVPs in the denial of
health care to patients, as we cannot expect that
the values of the persons disadvantaged will be
uniform.
Procedural justice
Perhaps the justification we are looking for can be
found in a claim about the right procedure to use
in allocating health care. Although moral princi-
ples might be the best guide in determining what
counts as a just distribution of health care
resources, it might also be true that the right
procedure to use in determining that allocation is
reliance on SVPs. To illustrate the point about
right procedure, imagine that you have a friend
who really does know you better than you know
yourself (this probably is not too hard for most
of us to imagine). In fact, she is perfectly reliable
in judging your best interests, whereas you are
only about 80 per cent reliable. If this is true,
should you not defer to her opinion in all choices
that impact your well being? In fact would it
not be irrational to act otherwise? You may
disagree; and not necessarily out of irrational
self-indulgence. Even though you agree that she
is a great person to go to for advice about
difficult decisions, you might still think that you
should be your own ultimate guide in these
matters. You might rightly claim, ‘Even if some-
one else is better than I am at judging where my
interests lie, it is better in general that I myself
make decisions that impact my own well-being.
This claim about the right procedure for making
these choices is independent of the goodness of the
outcome.
If a claim about just procedure is available, then
proponents of the use of SVPs will find an
independent reason for incorporating these pre-
ferences in health care resource distribution.
Perhaps this is the justification that Menzel has
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in mind when he claims that taking into account
the interests of the disadvantaged (through per-
sons thought to be representative) gives society a
response to the objections of the disadvantaged.
Perhaps he means to argue that since the interests
of the disadvantaged parties were taken into
account, the procedure of incorporating SVPs into
health care allocation decisions is just. Since the
procedure is just, the outcome is justified to that
extent (whether or not it represents the most just
distribution on its face).
Merely taking into account the interests of those
disadvantaged by the outcome does not seem to be
a sufficient foundation for a just procedure. To
establish a just procedure, we need to consider the
way in which these interests are taken into
account. In this case, we need a more general
account of why it is that an aggregation of
statistically representative individual’s preferences
can itself offer a fair method for the distribution of
a morally significant good such as health care.
Initially, it might seem that an obvious response is
to defer to the justifications of democratic
procedures in deciding issues that impact the
general society. In fact, Menzel and co-authors
seem to rely on a claim like this at one point
writing, ‘A good moral argument can be made that
it is paternalistic or antidemocratic to ignore any
of a population’s preferences about allocation of
health care’ [1]. Although the only explicit claim
here is that it would be antidemocratic to ignore a
population’s preferences, it seems implied that it is
democratic to respect these preferences. In this
case, an appeal to democratic procedure is an
implied moral justification for the use of SVPs in
health care allocation. In what follows, however,
we will show that the procedural justification used
to support democratic decision-making does not
carry over into a support of the use of SVPs.
Why is a democratic procedure a just proce-
dure? One argument is based on the notion of the
fundamental equality of all members of a political
community. When a political community encom-
passes members with very diverse sets of values, it
is often best to allow each to flourish as they see fit
(where this does not infringe on other’s flourish-
ing). However, choices must often be made for the
political community as a whole. Allocation of
resources controlled by the government offers one
such example. Since the democratic procedure of
one vote for each member of the community gives
everyone an equal opportunity to influence the
outcome, one could argue that this offers a fair
method for deciding such controversial issues. Of
course, for any given vote, no one can guarantee
that things will go their way. The outcome is a
collective decision that may end up pleasing no
one in particular. The point, however, is that if the
procedure is itself just, the outcome is justified
to that extent. So, in the case of a vote that does
not go my way, I must still abide by the outcome
once I have accepted the legitimacy of the
procedure.
SVPs are established by polling statistically
representative samples of the relevant (that is,
either directly or potentially affected) population.
There is much concern in the literature about
‘whom’ to ask in establishing SVPs. In particular,
researchers debate whether to sample members of
the general public (as potential patients) or
members of the particular diagnostic classes that
would be affected by any particular resource
allocation decision. As one can imagine, SVPs
may end up looking very different depending on
what group one chooses as the ‘relevant’ group for
the purpose of preference solicitation. Eric Nord,
Peter Ubel, Paul Menzel and others recommend
using a two-step model. In the first step actual
patients are asked to determine utility measures
for their particular conditions. The second step is
to use these utility measures in asking a
‘representative sample’ of the general public to
determine preferences for hypothetical allocation
schemes. These preferences could then be used as
preference (or as Nord prefers, ‘fairness’) weights
in QALY analyses, or would be otherwise
incorporated into CEA [6,7].
While it is certainly important methodologi-
cally to determine whom to ask in assessing
societal preferences for distributive schemes, this
debate relies on an assumption that is not itself
fundamentally democratic. That assumption
is that it is possible to substitute a statistically
representative sample of preferences for each
potentially affected person’s equal opportunity to
register their opinion by voting. This substitution,
however, is a centrepiece of the methodology
involved in eliciting public preferences. As Menzel
writes, ‘In reality we question only a sample of
people to establish our basic map of proportional
quality ratings, and we question only a relatively
small sample of patients to place them on the
spectrum of health states’ [5]. While this method
may lead to the same outcome as a general vote in
terms of ‘winning’ preferences, the democratic
procedural justification is lost.
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The following example might help in clarifying
this point. Important elections and ballot refer-
endums are usually accompanied by extensive
public opinion polling. As a matter of empirical
fact, these polls are almost unerring in the
accuracy with which they predict the results of
the actual voting process. So what would be wrong
with substituting such polls for the tedious (and
expensive) practice of holding actual votes? The
answer should be obvious. Even if the results are
comparable, only an actual vote carries with it the
procedural justification that is essential to democ-
racy. This would be the case even if, for example,
the actual ballots were lost and so it was
impossible to determine the outcome of the vote.
In other words, even if sample polling were the
only way to determine a winner, this method
would not carry with it the democratic procedural
justification.
We are not, of course, claiming that a demo-
cratic procedural justification requires that literally
everyone must have the option to register his or
her opinion on every decision. Rather, such a
justification requires only that everyone who is
relevantly affected by the decision (and who meets
other legally recognized criteria) is given the
option to have his or her voice heard. So, to
put this in the context of SVPs, only those who
are potentially affected by the particular alloca-
tion issue at hand would need to be consulted.
For example, in cases where the allocation
scheme is limited to a particular area or group
of patients, only members of that constituency
would need to be consulted. The problem is
just that the methodology in determining SVPs
is to sample members of this morally relevant
group of persons with the assumption that the
preferences of these persons are statistically
representative of the preferences of others in that
same group. However accurate such a method may
be, it is not to be mistaken for a democratic
procedure.
We do not mean to claim that supporters of
SVPs have somehow mistaken their methodology
for the equivalence of a vote. In fact, they are quite
specific on this point. Ubel writes, for instance,
‘Because governments and insurers, who often
play a large role in determining which services will
be available, cannot rely solely on voting booths or
free markets to tell them what patients want, they
must have some other way to find out’ [2]. This
‘other way’ of measuring what is wanted, is
‘sample polling’ SVPs.
We do, however, mean to argue that SVPs,
determined as they are by a relatively small
sample of the affected population, cannot be
justified by appeal to democratic procedure.
Since this aspect of the methodology is essential
to the project, we are skeptical of the claims
that using societal preferences is more democratic
than not using such preferences. Menzel asks,
‘Are the rights of individuals going to be
represented better in the cumbersome political
process than they are via the consent foundation
of a sensitively elicited quality-adjustment map?’
[5]. Contrary to Menzel’s own answer, we think
the answer may be ‘yes.’
Conclusion
In this paper we have argued, first, that propo-
nents of the use of SVPs need to be clear about the
relationship between these values and moral
principles. In particular, once moral principles
are accepted as ruling out some SVPs, an account
is needed of why we need appeal to SVPs at all
where moral principles might do the same work.
Second, we considered whether an independent
moral justification might underwrite the use of
SVPs. In various places in the literature the
notions of representation, presumed consent, and
democratic decision making appear to be invoked
as candidates for fulfilling this justificatory role.
We have raised some problems with each of these
justifications in the hopes of eliciting a more
comprehensive proposal from the proponents of
SVPs.
The move to incorporate SVPs into CEA
appears to be inspired in part by a commitment
to justice and fairness in the allocation of
scarce health care resources. In so far as the
authors we have discussed are motivated by the
desire to find a practical way to incorporate
such social values into health care allocation
schemes, we have a great deal of sympathy for
their work. While we do not want to deny that
social values may play a legitimate role in
formulating allocation policies, we stick fast
to the claim that the use of SVPs needs to be
justified. Without this justification, we worry
that the move from CUAs to SVPs is just a move
from an implicit reliance on a questionable
utilitarian standard to an explicit reliance on the
popularity of moral values.
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